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In this study we test for structural changes in international trade patterns of 77 
countries over the post-WWII period, to examine if they experienced a substantial increase in 
their trade ratios following major GATT rounds such as the Kennedy Round, or after joining 
GATT. Our results show that trade ratios of most of these countries exhibited structural 
breaks in their time paths, however, most of the postbreak paths were below the extrapolated 
prebreak paths. Furthermore, while the significant break years coincided closely with major 
regional and international events such as the oil shocks of the 70s and the East-Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, they occurred far before or after the time of a country's accession to GATT or 
the time of the major GATT rounds.  
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1. Introduction 
International trade has not only grown dramatically since the Second World War, but 
has consistently grown more rapidly than world income. More specifically, the world's share 
of merchandise exports in GDP has increased from 5.5% in 1950 to 17.2% in 1998 
(Maddison, 2001). This trend has been attributed, among other factors,  to extensive trade 
liberalization measures as manifested by reductions in trade barriers that were facilitated by 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Krugman, 1995; Irwin, 1995).
1  
In light of the postwar GATT process of trade liberalization, Ben-David and Papell 
(1997) (BP hereafter) used  endogenous structural break tests to determine if and when 
countries experienced structural changes in the paths of their trade ratios.  In cases of 
significant structural breaks, they compared the postbreak to prebreak averages of the trade 
ratios (hereafter referred to as BP's procedure). Since BP found significant breaks and 
increases in the trade ratios, they attributed these breaks mainly to the trade liberalization 
reforms launched following the implementation of the Kennedy Round of GATT. However, 
the ability of GATT to increase international trade has been challenged in a recent series of 
papers (see  Rose (2004a, b)). Using gravity models and large panel data sets, Rose concluded 
that GATT\WTO did not increase trade among member countries, nor did it even produce 
more open trade policies among member countries. A number of studies have questioned the 
findings of Rose based on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Taking account of several 
liberalization asymmetries between developing and developed countries, and between 
developing countries that joined the GATT before and after the Uruguay Round, in addition to 
refining Rose's empirical methodology, Subramanian and Wei (2007) found that membership 
had a strong, however, uneven impact on international trade. Tomz et al. (2005) argue that 
Rose (2004a) mistakenly classified countries as outsiders and thus systematically 
                                                            
1Other factors that were found to explain the increase in international trade over the post WWII period include 
institutional harmonization and economic integration among world economies (Sachs and Warner, 1995); 
increases in real output and international reserves (Rose, 1991); lower transportation costs (Krugman, 1995).   3
underestimate the effect of membership on trade. When correcting for country classification 
they found that GATT substantially increased trade among its members. The debate regarding 
the impact of GATT on increasing international trade is not settled yet, and in this paper we 
try to contribute to this controversy e using time series analysis of international trade patterns.  
 We examine the impact of GATT on increasing international trade, using endogenous 
structural breakpoint tests. First, we reevaluate BP's findings by applying a different 
methodology to compare the prebreak and postbreak trade ratios, to correctly identify positive 
changes that can potentially be a result of trade liberalization reforms.  Second, we test if a 
positive structural break of a country can be attributed to the country's accession to GATT or 
to major GATT rounds by comparing the break date to the accession or major rounds dates. 
Our departure point is that if GATT was influential in increasing international trade then we 
could expect to find positive structural breaks in a country's trade ratios close to either the 
date of joining GATT or to the dates of the major GATT rounds.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the trade measures used in the 
paper as well as the data sources. Section 3 lays out the econometric methodology for 
performing the sequential trend break tests. Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes our results and draws conclusions. 
2. Measurement and Data Sources 
We test for structural breaks according to the same two measures of trade openness 
used in BP's study: the share of nominal merchandise imports in nominal GDP (MY ratio) and 
the share of nominal merchandise exports in nominal GDP (XY ratio). Data for merchandise 
imports and exports (in current $US) were obtained from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 2005 CD. To calculate the trade ratios, GDP data were converted from IFS 
data in local currencies to $US using mid-year official exchange rates. Our sample covers 77 
countries over the period 1948-2004; the first observation is no later than 1968, and the last   4
observation is no earlier than 1989, with a minimum of 36 annual observations. We also make 
the same structural break analysis over the shorter sample period 1948 to 1993, as in BP's 
study, to test for the sensitivity of the results to the time span. 
3. Trend Break Tests 
Earlier works on structural changes in a univariate time series were done under 
restrictive assumptions such as independent and identically distributed data, non-trending 
data, and/or stationary data. In this paper, we apply Vogelsang's (1997) test for detecting 
shifts in the trend function of a dynamic time series which successfully relaxes the 
aforementioned assumptions. The test allows for both serial correlation and trending data, and 
is valid whether or not the series is stationary. These features are important because the trade 
ratios exhibit unit roots, are obviously trending in most of the cases, and may be serially 
correlated. 
 For one break in quadratic trending, linear trending, or non-trending data, 
Vogelsang’s (1997) Sup Wald (or SupWt) test involves estimating equation (1), equation (2), 
or equation (3), respectively.    
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  The exact specification of the test depends on the trending that characterizes the data. 
Equation (1) allows for both a linear and a quadratic trend in data, Equation (2) allows for a 
linear trend in data, and Equation (3) allows for no trend in data.   
  For each TB, the value of k (the number of lags in the right-hand side of equation (1)) 
has to be chosen. There exists considerable evidence that data-dependent methods for 
selecting the lag length of k  are superior to making an a priori choice of k . We adopt an 
approach suggested by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) to determine the optimal lag length. We 
start with an upper bound of k=8, where if c8 is significant, k will take the value 8; otherwise 
we choose k=7 and check again if c7 is significant. We continue thusly until the last lag 
becomes significant; otherwise k=0 will be chosen.   
  Equations (1)-(3) are estimated sequentially for each break year with 15 percent 
trimming, i.e., for 0.15T< TB <0.85T, where T is the number of observations. For model (1), 
SupWt is the maximum over all possible trend breaks, of three times the standard F-test 
statistic for testing the null hypothesis 0 2 1 = = = γ γ θ . For model (2), SupWt is the maximum 
of two times the standard F for testing 0 1 = = γ θ , and for model (3), SupWt is the maximum 
of the standard F-statistic for testing  0 = θ . 
  As mentioned, Vogelsang's test is valid whether or not a unit root is present in a series. 
The critical values, however, depend on whether the series is stationary or contains a unit 
root. If the calculated values of the SupWt statistic are larger than the critical values under the 
unit root case calculated in Vogelsang (1997), we reject the null hypothesis of a no-trend 
break regardless of whether or not the data have a unit root. If these values are smaller than 
the critical values of SupWt with a unit root, but larger than those in the stationary case, we 
have to test for unit roots. If these tests reject the null of a unit root then one can conclude that 
a breakpoint exists. We apply then the Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root test with a linear time   6
trend that allows for possible structural break in the trend to test for unit roots in the trade 
ratios series. 
The structural change literature provides little guidance regarding the choice of the 
trend to include in the estimated model. If the data have a linear or a quadratic trend, then 
estimating a model which does not contain the appropriate trend may fail to capture a 
significant break. On the other hand, the power to reject a no-trend-break null when there is a 
break is reduced when estimating a model which includes a trend that is not contained in the 
data because the critical values increase with the inclusion of more trends. Here we use the 
following algorithm proposed by BP for model selection. First, model (1), the model of the 
quadratic trend, is estimated. If we reject the null of no-trend-break (at a 10 percent level or 
lower), then we report the SupWt test results. If the model (1) null cannot be rejected, then 
model (2) is estimated and the results are reported if we reject the null of no-trend-break. If 
model (2) null cannot be rejected, then model (3) is estimated and, like before, the results are 
reported if the null is rejected.  
4. Empirical findings 
The results of the Vogelsang SupWt test are reported in Table 1. For the MY ratios, the 
no-trend-break null was rejected in 41 out of the 77 countries at the 10% significance level, 34 
at the 5% level, and 23 at the 1% level.
2 Among the OECD countries, the share of significant 
breaks (at the 10% level) was higher than that in the developing countries; 64% of the OECD 
countries experienced structural breaks in their MY ratios compared to less than 50% in 
developing countries.  For the XY ratios, the null of a no-trend-break was rejected in 48 out of 
the 77 countries at the 10% significance level, 34 at the 5% level, and 23 at the 1% level. The 
shares of significant breakpoints in the XY of both OECD and developing countries were very 
                                                            
2 Since the results of the Phillips-Perron unit root tests show less than 5% incidence of  unit roots in the trade 
ratios, we adopt the critical values for nonstationary data from Vogelsang (1997).      7
similar: 62% of developing countries experienced structural breaks in their XY ratios 
compared to 64% in OECD countries.  
The breakpoint test only reveals if the time series has experienced a structural break 
during the period tested, but provides no information about the nature of the change. As such, 
a comparative analysis of the trade behavior before and after the break cannot be made.  To 
deal with this problem, BP compared the postbreak averages of trade ratios (either MY or 
XY) to the prebreak averages for countries where significant breaks were detected. They 
found that about 80% of the countries that had experienced significant breaks had exhibited 
increases in the averages of trade ratios. Although BP were aware of the possible effect of  
the1973 oil shocks on these breaks, they mostly attributed them to trade liberalization 
reforms, especially those after the Kennedy Round. 
The patterns of both the MY and XY ratios reveal clear upwarding trends, and 
therefore, when calculating the percent change in the postbreak to prebreak trade ratio, as BP 
did, it is most likely to be positive, regardless if there is a significant break or not. To 
illustrate this, we consider the cases of Finland and Ireland. From Table 1, the SupWt statistic 
results reveal a significant break in the MY ratio of Ireland in 1978 and a marginally 
significant break in 1979 in Finland's MY ratio. In both cases, the percent changes in 
postbreak to prebreak trade ratios are positive (15% for Finland and 21% for Ireland). As can 
be seen from Figures 1 and 2, prior to the breakpoints there were upward sloping trends of the 
MY ratios and despite the downward sloping of these trends after the break years, the percent 
changes in the postbreak to prebreak trade ratio averages were still largely positive. Adopting 
BP's interpretation of higher postbreak relative to prebreak trade averages, one can argue that 
Ireland, and Finland to some extent, had experienced a dramatic change in its trade ratio as a 
result of trade liberalization reforms that it presumably had undertaken prior to the break year. 
However, as evident from the graphs, both countries had shown negative sloping trends in   8
their MY ratios, and therefore, it is obvious that the turn from a positive into a negative 
sloping trend, following the break cannot be a result of trade liberalization policies. Similar 
downward postbreaks can be found in the MY trends of Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal , and Syria, among others; and in the 
XY trends of Algeria, Belgium, Botswana, Cyprus, El Salvador, Gabon, Haiti, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
In the following we reevaluate BP's comparative analysis of the prebreak\postbreak 
trade ratios using a different procedure that involves comparing the average of the observed 
postbreak trade ratios to the average that would have prevailed if the prebreak trend was to 
continue (hereafter referred to as AA's procedure). The rationale for doing this is simple. If 
we assume the existence of  a trend in the trade ratios, then, in the absence of a significant 
break beyond any point of time the observed values of the series will be the same as the 
extrapolated values. However, if a structural break exists then the continuation of the trend 
after that point will differ from the actual values. To learn how substantial that structural 
change is, one needs to compare the extrapolated and the actual postbreak parts of the trend. 
A dramatic positive change at a specific date would shift the trend above the continuation of 
its prebreak part. This shift is, of course, sufficient for the postbreak average to exceed the 
prebreak one.  
Table 1 (columns 5 and 9) compares the percent changes in postbreak actual trade 
ratios to the extrapolated postbreak trade ratios based on the trend that prevailed until the 
break date (labeled AA), and those based on BP's procedure (columns 6 and 10).  For the MY 
ratio, only in two out of the 14 OECD countries and in 12 out of the 27 developing countries 
where significant breaks were detected was the average of the actual values higher than the 
average that would have prevailed if the prebreak trend was to continue. Using BP's 
procedure, in seven out of  the 14 OECD, and in 16 out of  the 27 developing countries, the   9
postbreak averages were higher than the prebreak averages of the MY ratios.  In the case of 
the XY ratio, only in five out of the 14 OECD countries and in 18 out of the 34 developing 
countries where significant breaks were detected, was the average of the actual values higher 
than the average that would have prevailed if the prebreak trend was to continue. Using BP's 
procedure, in ten out of  the14 OECD, and in 20 out of  the 34 developing countries, the 
postbreak averages are higher than the prebreak averages of the XY ratios. As expected, the 
results based on BP's procedure show a higher rate of positive structural breaks than the 
results based on AA's procedure, especially for the MY ratios.  
The above results are not in line with what one would expect for countries undergoing 
a process of trade liberalization. Engaging in trade liberalization reforms would entail the 
actual postbreak ratios to be higher than the extrapolated ratios. Even adopting BP's 
procedure, in only about 50% of the countries, the postbreak average of the MY ratios was 
higher than the prebreak average in both OECD and developing countries, a figure that is far 
below that in BP's 1997 study, where in more than 80% of countries with significant structural 
breaks, was the postbreak trade average higher than the prebreak average. This discrepancy 
can be attributed to sample differences both in terms of the number of countries covered or 
time span.  
In the following we test for the sensitivity of the break dates to the difference in the 
time spans. Panel A of Table 2 shows both the break years of the trade ratios based on the 
shorter sample period 1948-1993, as in BP's study, and those of the extended sample period 
1948-2004. Since for some countries there are not enough observations to test for structural 
breaks in trade ratios when using the 1948-1993 sample period, the comparison between 
break dates from the two sample periods is restricted to countries where the 1948-1993 
sample period allows for structural break testing, and where significant breaks were detected 
using both time spans.   10
Panel B of Table 2 compares the break dates based on the two sample periods. For 
developing countries 44.4% of the break years in the MY ratios coincide, and in 70.3% of the 
cases, the breaks based on one sample period took place in a distance of less than four years 
from those based on the other sample period. Similar results are obtained for the XY ratios; 
about half of the breaks coincided, and about 65% of the breaks based one sample period took 
place in a distance of less than four years from those based on the other. For OECD countries, 
only 25% of the significant breakpoints in both MY and XY ratios coincide, and less than 
40% of breaks based on the extended sample period took place in a window of four years 
around the break year based on the shorter sample period. Two important observations are 
worth mentioning. First, most of the countries where the break dates from the two sample 
periods coincided experienced structural breaks very close to the time of one of the two oil 
shocks of the 70s. From Table 2 we can see that more than 50% of the breaks in the MY 
ratios and  55% of the breaks in the XY ratios of developing countries based on either one of 
the sample periods occurred in a window of two years about the time of the oil shocks of 
1973/4 and 1979/80. The corresponding figures are even higher for OECD countries. Second, 
among the developing countries where the break dates diverge, are the East-Asian countries 
that suffered most from the 1997 financial crisis. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand experienced significant structural breaks in their XY ratios in 1997, the same year of 
the financial crisis. Examining exports and GDP separately, it appears that the hard slump in 
the national output of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, was the reason behind the negative 
structural change in the XY ratios of these countries. Naturally, these breaks would not have 
been detected using the shorter time span of 1948-1993.  
Next, we test if the positive structural breaks, that can potentially be a result of trade 
liberalization reforms, in the extended sample period can be attributed to the tariff reductions 
following the Kennedy Round. If these reductions had a substantial impact on increasing trade   11
ratios then we can expect that positive breaks would occur following the Kennedy Round, 
especially in the case of the OECD countries for which the tariff reductions mostly pertain. 
Figure 3 presents a scatter diagram of the positive break years of the countries where the 
postbreak trade average is higher than the prebreak average. As can be seen, the break years 
are widely scattered around 1972, the year when tariff reductions were completed. The break 
years of the MY ratios of the OECD countries are distributed  in a range of one to 25 years 
after 1972 with an average of 11 years. In the case of the developing countries, these breaks 
are distributed in a range of up to 25 years after 1972 with an average of 11 years, with only 
one break occurring ten years before 1972. Similar results are obtained for the XY ratios. 
Figure 4 shows a scatter diagram of the positive breaks, according to the AA procedure, and 
again we can see that the breaks are widely scattered around 1972. The above results further 
undermine BP's conclusion that trade liberalization policies following the Kennedy Round 
were the major determinants of the breakpoints in the trade ratios, and suggest that major 
international events, such as the oil shocks of the 70s and the financial crisis in East-Asia, 
might be responsible for the structural breaks in trade ratios. In the following we explain why 
the observed structural breaks are not likely to result from tariff reductions instituted by 
Kennedy Round.  
The Kennedy Round, which lasted from 1963 to 1967, yielded agreements that 
significantly reduced tariff levels of developed countries on industrial products by a third on 
average (Preeg, 1970). However, the potential impact of the tariff reductions was partially 
offset by the introduction of nontariff trade barriers arising from political pressure of major 
industries which were affected by the tariff reductions (see Marvel and Ray (1983) for the 
case of the US). In addition, the significant achievement of the Kennedy Round was a 
substantial reduction of tariffs on manufactured products, especially in technologically-
advanced industries, by developed countries. Thus, while we may expect large increases in   12
the multilateral trade of these countries, we would not necessarily expect increases in imports 
of developing countries. Finally, the exports of the developing countries consisted mainly of 
raw materials and primary goods that were subjected to low or no tariffs by developed 
countries, and of processed agricultural products and textile, which received only modest 
tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round (Preeg, 1970).  Therefore, we would not expect 
positive structural breaks in the trade ratios of developing countries that constitute the bulk of 
BP’s sample.  
Our next consideration is to test if GATT membership contributed to increasing 
international trade. We do this by utilizing the break dates we found in the previous section 
and comparing them to the country's accession date to GATT. We pay special  attention for 
countries that joined GATT after the Uruguay Round, when the impact of GATT on the trade 
of developing countries became substantial (Subramanian and Wei, 2007).
3  
Figure 5 presents a scatter diagram of the break years in the trade ratios of developing 
countries about the time of the accession year to GATT. As can be seen clearly, only a few 
breaks occurred in a window of ten years about the time of their joining GATT. Figure 6 
presents a numerical distribution of the these break about the time of their joining GATT. We  
can see that a small fraction of the countries with significant breaks in either MY or XY 
experienced a structural break around the accession to GATT. Less than 17% of the countries 
experienced significant  structural breaks in their MY ratios, and less than 20% experienced 
significant  structural breaks in their XY ratios, in a window of ten years about their accession 
to GATT. Focusing only on countries that experienced structural positive breaks, only two of 
the 11 significant structural breaks took place in a window of ten years about the time of the 
accession to GATT. These results suggest that developing countries did not experience any 
substantial increase in their trade ratios about the time of their accession to GATT, and the 
                                                            
3 We focus here on developing countries since most of developed countries were among the founders of GATT 
in 1948 or joined GATT soon after that date. Since our data begins after 1948, there is no way to test if 
membership of these countries in GATT resulted in structural breaks in their trade ratios.   13
small number of countries that did experience did so either long before or after the accession 
year. This makes it difficult to relate the structural breaks to GATT membership. When we 
focus on developing countries that joined GATT after the Uruguay Round in 1986, once again 
the results do not support any significant impact of membership in GATT. Among the twelve 
countries that joined GATT after the Uruguay Round none experienced significant positive 
structural breaks, in either of their trade ratios. When using the BP procedure, three countries 
are seen to have experienced positive structural breaks in their MY ratio, and six in their XY 
ratios, however, in both cases the breaks occurred long before the Uruguay Round.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we addressed the question of whether the Kennedy Round or GATT 
membership increased international trade by using sequential structural break tests in 
international trade ratios over the period 1948-2004. We found that most countries 
experienced structural breaks in their trade patterns, however, in most cases the postbreak 
average of the extrapolated prebreak ratios was higher than that of the actual ratios. For a 
large number of countries, the postbreak trends of the trade ratios were found to be downward 
sloping, even though the postbreak average of the trade ratios was higher than the prebreak 
average. In addition, the break years of the small fraction of countries that had experienced 
positive structural breaks in their trade ratios scatter widely around 1972, the year when tariff 
reductions instituted by the Kennedy Round were completed, and around the accession years 
to GATT. These results indicate that the detected structural breaks cannot be attributed to 
trade liberalization that countries might have adopted following the Kennedy Round, as BP 
argue, or to GATT membership. On the other hand, the significant break years coincided 
closely with major regional and international events such as the oil shocks of the 70s, and the 
East-Asian financial crisis in 1997, which suggest that these events might be responsible for a 
considerable part of the observed structural breaks.    14
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Table 1.   Sequential trend break tests (1948-2004) 
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  Developing Countries         
1  Algeria   1962
I  36.0**  -47.2
§  -36.1  1980
I  17.1     
2  Argentina  1993
III  19.0**  -81.0  -81.0  1998
I  41.2***  77.4  121.6 
3  Barbados  1991
I  14.1      1985
I  11.8     
4  Botswana  1993
I  50.0***  82.0  -55.9  1988
I  72.1***  -75.9  -22.6 
5  Burundi  1986
I  53.8***  135.3
§  119.8  1977
I  46.4***  -85.8  -14.6 
6  Brazil  1974
I  38.7***  -48.1  -7.5  1982
I  42.6***  -13.6  20.6 
7  Cameron  1980
I  41.7***  -58.7  -34.0  1992
I  22.0     
8  Chile  1973
II  27.0**  551.8  78.9  1987
I  20.3     
9  Colombia  1992
I  10.8      1971
II  24.5*  105.4  14.8 
10  Costa Rica  1981
I  48.7***  -32.0  27.3  1980
I  18.0     
11  Cote D´ivoire  1993
I  17.6      1983
I  27. 9*  68.8  13.4 
12  Cyprus  1975
II  26.1**  17.3  4.3  1975
I  53.9***  -55.3  -17.0 
13  Dominican R.  1984
III  27.3***  -72.7  -72.7  1975
I  11.0     
14  Ecuador  1981
I  24.3      1973
I  23.5     
15  Egypt  1973
I  29.2*  94.5
§  33.8  1988
I  13.60     
16  El Salvador  1972
I  20.3      1979
I  34.6**  -76.4  -46.8 
17  Ethiopia  1990
I  54.4***  9.5  57.1  1993
I  32.3**  239.1
§  5.2 
18  Gabon  1976
I  24.0      1985
I  29.5*  -34.4  -6.5 
19  Ghana  1973
I  22.0      1971
I  44.4***  -14.0  -48. 7 
20  Guyana  1987
I  13.3      1986
III  19.5**  48.2  48.2 
21  Haiti  1984
I  95.6***  -60.4  32.0  1979
I  46.7***  -75.6  -31.3 
22  Honduras  1973
I  27.3      1980
I  11.8     
23  India  1973
I  14.9      1975
I  14.0     
24  Indonesia  1997
I  37.9**  8.0  53.7  1997
I  45.6***  126.4  65.4 
25  Iran  1992
I  179.0***  242.1
§  3.5  1992
I  39.3***  556.0
§  16.3 
26  Jamaica  1975
I  32.2**  -37.8  28.0  1976
I  23.9     
27  Jordan  1982
I  16.6      1988
I  17.6     
28  Kenya  1992
I  22.9      1984
III  18.7**  -21.8  -21.8 
29  Korea  1985
I  39.4***  -37.5  23.8  1997
I  29.8*  27.6  96.7 
30  Libya  1972
I  52.4***  -87.7  -11.7  1973
I  37.5**  -133.3  -22.0 
31  Madagascar  1972
I  45.7***  -95.6  -41.1  1971
I  50.6***  -98.1  -33.3 
32  Malawi  1983
I  21.7      1993
I  29.9*  75.0  21.2 
33  Malaysia  1988
III  28.0***  96.9  96.9  1997
I  36.6**  3.3  94.5 
34  Malta  1989
I  15.3      1980
I  13.8     
35  Mauritius  1981
I  18.3      1975
I  20.7     
36  Mexico  1962
I  39.3***  -83.4  73.8  1994
I  28.5*  10.8  220.0 
37  Morocco  1985
I  20.9      1973
I  10.1     
38  Niger  1985
I  13.0      1980
I  15.8     
39  Nigeria  1980
I  17.3      1989
I  19.9     
40  Oman  1989
I  16.9      1981
I  32.3*  35.7












Table 1 Continued 
41  Pakistan  1977
III  22.2**  -77.8  -77.8  1983
I  17.0     
42  Panama  1973
I  23.2      1973
I  45.9***  -58.7  3.3 
43  Paraguay  1988
I  37.4**  317.5  120.1  1983
I  38.8***  1324.0  32.0 
44  Peru  1973
I  12.2      1976
I  23.3     
45  Philippines  1983
I  24.0      1995
I  47.0***  86.6  217.4 
46  S. Arabia  1981
I  32.0*  -67.7  31.1  1973
I  52.6***  -119.6  -20.1 
47  Singapore  1985
I  18.5      1978
I  30.3*  -62.3  23.3 
48  S. Africa  1979
I  20.5      1976
I  19.6     
49  Sri Lanka  1977
I  97.9***  238.9  53.5  1977
I  30.6*  88.6  7.8 
50  Sudan  1989
I  31.8*  54.0  -6.6  1973
I  31.3**  5.5
§  -54.0 
51  Syria  1977
I  120.7***  -87.3  -28.6  1997
I  30.2*  280.4  51. 6 
52  Thailand  1994
I  16.3      1997
I  37.8**  23.8  173.0 
53  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1976
I  21.6      1973
I  95.6***  -37.4  -18.2 
54  Venezuela  1978
I  21.4      1973
I  14.3     
55  Zambia  1971
I  39.5***  -68.1  -58.8  1985
II  25.2**  30.5
§  -45.5 
Developed Countries         
                   
1  Australia  1992
III  23.7***  -76.3  -76.3  1968
I  103.8***  -72.1  -16. 6 
2  Austria  1982
I  21.3      1992
I  35.2**  19.2  56.1 
3  Belgium  1983
I  37.2**  -28.1  36.4  1988
I  26.6     
4  Canada  1988
I  21.7      1988
I  45.0***  -11.0  57.8 
5  Denmark  1986
I  30.5*  -19. 7  -8.1  1985
I  33.3*  -18.4  21.5 
6  Finland  1979
I  28.1*  -31.8  15.0  1991
I  17.2     
7  France  1980
I  18.5      1981I  16.1     
8  Germany  1984
I  27.3      1990
I  48.7***  -28.4  18.4 
9  Greece  1973
I  18.4      1968
I  28.2*  30.4
§  57.3 
10  Iceland  1992
I  28.3*  19.5  -7.7  1965
I  17.3     
11  Ireland  1978
I  58.7***  -39.9  21.0  1989
I  18.8     
12  Italy  1981
I  31.6**  -52.8  22.3  1992
I  19.0     
13  Japan  1981
I  36.6**  -60.6  -24.9  1985
I  50.1***  -42.8  -3.0 
14  Luxembourg  1985
I  85.4***  -27.7  -17.4  1992
I  32.33*  13.1  -39.5 
15  Netherlands  1985
I  30.3*  -37.8  -7.4  1981
I  50.7***  -43.0  10.1 
16  New Zealand  1985
I  26.1      1985
I  41.8***  -39. 8  -2.2 
17  Norway  1982
I  40.6***  16.6  -26.6  1985
I  42.3***  -32.8  32.9 
18  Portugal  1983
I  45.2***  -46.5  31.0  1982
I  26.9***  55.9  55.9 
19  Sweden  1983
I  18.8      1983
I  30.8*  -24.1  43.1 
20  Switzerland  1989
I  33.6**  -12.4  0.6  1975
I  26.9     
21  UK  1973
I  55. 8***  -17.9  23.5  1972
I  24.2     
22  USA  1973
I  27.1      1972
III  21.2**  79.1  79.1 
I,II, and III, denote the model type. 
***,**, and * denote statistical significance using unit root critical values at the 1, 5, and 10% levels from Table 2 of 
Vogelsang (1997). For model I, these values are 38.35, 31.29, and 27.99, respectively. For model II, the critical 
values are 30.36, 25.10, and 22.29, respectively. For model III the critical values are 22.48, 17.88, and 15.78, 
respectively.  
§ The prebreak trend was downward sloping so the average of the postbreak extrapolated ratios was negative. For 
this reason the AA index compares the actual postbreak average to the level of the trade ratio at the eve of the break 
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Table 2.  Sequential trend break tests 1948-2004 and 1948-1993 
    Import-GDP ratios  Export-GDP ratios 









  Developing Countries 
1  Algeria   1962  1962     
2  Brazil  1974  1974  1982  1982 
3  Colombia  1977  1992     
4  Costa Rica  1982  1981     
5  Cyprus      1975  1975 
6  Dominican R.  1984  1984     
7  Ecuador  1985  1981  1971  1973 
8  El Salvador      1980  1979 
9  Ghana      1971  1971 
10  Guatemala  1981  1981  1980  1980 
11  Guyana  1978  1987  1981  1986 
12  Haiti  1978  1984  1979  1979 
13  India  1973  1973  1975  1975 
14  Jamaica  1975  1975  1979  1976 
15  Korea  1968  1985     
16  Mauritius  1972  1981     
17  Mexico      1981  1994 
18  Morocco  1972  1985     
19  Nigeria  1979  1980  1979  1989 
20  Pakistan  1977  1977  1971  1983 
21  Panama  1973  1973  1973  1973 
22  Paraguay  1987  1988     
23  Peru      1976  1976 
24  Philippines  1983  1983  1980  1995 
25  Singapore  1979  1985  1980  1978 
26  S. Africa  1979  1979  1971  1976 
27  Sri Lanka  1977  1977  1977  1977 
28  Sudan  1985  1989  1973  1973 
29  Thailand  1987  1994  1985  1997 
30  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
1973  1976  1973  1973 
31  Venezuela  1976  1978  1981  1973 
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Table 2 Continued  
Developed Countries 
           
1  Australia  1971  1992  1971  1968 
2  Austria  1968  1982  1985  1992 
3  Belgium  1983  1983  1974  1988 
4  Canada  1981  1988     
5  Denmark  1972  1986     
6  Finland      1981  1991 
7  France  1966  1980  1970  1981 
8  Germany  1985  1984  1985  1990 
9  Greece  1971  1973     
10  Iceland  1974  1992  1974  1965 
11  Ireland  1978  1978  1971  1989 
12  Italy  1973  1981  1979  1992 
13  Japan  1985  1981  1977  1985 
14  Netherlands  1985  1985  1981  1981 
15  New Zealand  1973  1985     
16  Norway  1977  1982  1985  1985 
17  Portugal  1978  1983     
18  Sweden  1973  1983  1974  1983 
19  Switzerland  1974  1989  1975  1975 
20  UK  1973  1973  1977  1972 
21  USA  1973  1973  1972  1972 
Panel B 
Developed Countries  Developing Countries   
MY  XY  MY  XY 
A1  25%  25%  44.4%  47.8% 
A2  40%  31.3%  70.4%  65.2% 
Key: 
A1: % of countries where break years based on the 1948-2004 sample period coincide with break years based on 
the 1948-1993 sample period. 
A2: % of countries where break years based on 1948-2004 sample period fall in a four year window around  break 
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